A shuffle of a set of ciphertexts is a new set of ciphertexts with the same plaintexts in permuted order. Shuffles of homomorphic encryptions are a key component in mix-nets, which in turn are used in protocols for anonymization and voting. Since the plaintexts are encrypted it is not directly verifiable whether a shuffle is correct, and it is often necessary to prove the correctness of a shuffle using a zeroknowledge proof or argument.
Introduction
A shuffle of ciphertexts 1 , . . . , is a new set of ciphertexts 1 , . . . , with the same plaintexts in permuted order. Shuffles are used in many protocols for anonymous communication and voting. It is usually important to verify the correctness of the shuffle. Take for instance a voting protocol where the ciphertexts are encrypted votes; it is important to avoid that some of the ciphertexts in the shuffle are substituted with encryptions of other votes. There has therefore been much research on designing zero-knowledge arguments 1 for the correctness of a shuffle [SK95, Abe98, AH01, FS01, Nef01, Nef03, Gro03, FMM + 02, NSNK06, OT05, NSNK05, Fur05, GL07, Wik05] .
When designing shuffle arguments, efficiency is a major concern. It is realistic to have elections with millions of encrypted votes, in which case the statement to be proven is very large. In this paper, our main goal is to get a practical shuffle argument with low communication complexity. A theoretical solution to this problem would be to use Kilian's communication-efficient zero-knowledge argument [Kil92] (see also Micali [Mic00] ). This method, however, requires a reduction to Circuit Satisfiability, a subsequent application of the PCP-theorem [AS98, ALM + 98, Din07] , and using a collision-free hash-function to build a hash-tree 2 Preliminaries
Notation
We let Σ denote the symmetric group on {1, 2, . . . , }. Given two functions , : ℕ → [0, 1] we write ( ) ≈ ( ) when | ( ) − ( )| = ( − ) for every constant . We say that the function is negligible when ( ) ≈ 0 and that it is overwhelming when ( ) ≈ 1.
Algorithms in our shuffle argument will get a security parameter as input, which specifies the size of the group we are working over. Sometimes we for notational simplicity avoid writing this explicitly, assuming can be deduced indirectly from other inputs given to the algorithms.
All our algorithms will be probabilistic polynomial time algorithms. We will assume that they can sample randomness from sets of the type ℤ . We note that such randomness can be sampled from a source of uniform random bits in expected polynomial time (in log ).
We write ( ; ) = when , on input and randomness , outputs . We write ← ( ) for the process of picking randomness at random and setting := ( ; ). We also write ← for sampling uniformly at random from the set .
When defining security, we assume that there is an adversary attacking our scheme. This adversary is modeled as a non-uniform polynomial time stateful algorithm. By stateful, we mean that we do not need to give it the same input twice, it remembers from the last invocation what its state was. This makes the notation a little simpler, since we do not need to explicitly write out the transfer of state from one invocation to the next.
Group Generation
We will work over a group of a prime order . This could for instance be a subgroup of ℤ * , where is a prime and gcd( 2 , − 1) = ; or it could be an elliptic curve group or subgroup. We will assume the discrete logarithm problem is hard in . More precisely, let be a generating algorithm that takes a security parameter as input and outputs := ( , , ), where by we denote a computationally efficient representation of the group and is a random generator for . The discrete logarithm assumption says that for any non-uniform polynomial time adversary :
Pr [ ( , , ) ← (1 ); ← ℤ ; ℎ := : ( , , , ℎ) = ] ≈ 0.
(When the randomness of is taken from a common random string, the above definition needs to be strengthened so that is given the randomness used by .)
Generalized Pedersen Commitment
We will use a variant of the Pedersen commitment scheme [Ped91] that permits making a commitment to a length-vector in ℤ rather than a single element of ℤ as in Pedersen's original commitment. A crucial feature of this generalization is that the amount of communication it involves does not grow with . The generalized scheme proceeds as follows. The key generation algorithm com takes ( , , ) as input and outputs a commitment key := ( 1 , . . . , , ℎ), where 1 , . . . , , ℎ are randomly chosen generators of . The message space is ℳ := ℤ , the randomizer space is ℛ := ℤ and the commitment space is := .
(The parameter will be given as an additional input to all algorithms; however, we prefer to keep it implicit in the notation.)
To commit to an -tuple ( 1 , . . . , ) ∈ ℤ we pick randomness ← ℤ and compute the commitment := ℎ ∏
=1
. The commitment is perfectly hiding since no matter what the messages are, the commitment is uniformly distributed in . The commitment is computationally binding under the discrete logarithm assumption; we will skip the simple proof.
The commitment key will be part of the common random string in our shuffle argument. We remark that it can be sampled from a random string. We write := com ( 1 , . . . , ; ) for making a commitment to 1 , . . . , using randomness . The commitment scheme is homomorphic, i.e., for all
In some cases we will commit to less than elements; this can be accomplished quite easily by setting the remaining messages to 0. We will always assume that parties check that commitments are valid, meaning they check that ∈ . If is a subgroup of ℤ * this can be done by checking that = 1, however, batch verification techniques can be used to lower this cost when we have multiple commitments to check. 2 If is an elliptic curve of order , then the validity check just consists of checking that is a point on the curve, which is very inexpensive.
ElGamal Encryption
ElGamal encryption [ElG85] in the group works as follows. The public key is := = with a random secret key := ← ℤ * . The message space is ℳ := , the randomizer space is ℛ := ℤ and the ciphertext space is := × . To encrypt a message ∈ using randomness ∈ ℤ we compute the ciphertext ( ; ) := ( , ). To decrypt a ciphertext ( , ) we compute = − . The semantic security of ElGamal encryption is equivalent to the DDH assumption. Semantic security may be needed for the shuffle itself to be secure; however, the security of our shuffle argument will rely on the discrete logarithm assumption only. In particular, our shuffle argument is still sound and zero-knowledge even if the cryptosystem is insecure or the decryption key has been exposed.
ElGamal encryption is homomorphic with entry-wise multiplication in the ciphertext space. For all ( , ), ( ′ , ′ ) ∈ ℳ × ℛ we have
We will always assume that the ciphertexts in the shuffle are valid, i.e., ( , ) ∈ × . Batch verification techniques can reduce the cost of verifying validity when we have multiple ciphertexts. To further reduce the cost of ciphertext verification, Groth [Gro03] suggests a variant of ElGamal encryption that makes batch-checking ciphertext validity faster. Our shuffle argument works also for this variant of ElGamal encryption.
Our shuffle argument works with many types of cryptosystems; the choice of ElGamal encryption is made mostly for notational convenience. Our technique can be directly applied with any homomorphic cryptosystem that has a message space of order . We are neither restricted to using the same underlying group ( , , ) as the commitment scheme nor restricted to using ElGamal encryption or variants thereof. Using techniques from [Gro03] it is also possible to generalize the shuffle argument to work for cryptosystems that do not have message spaces of order . This latter application does require a few changes to the shuffle argument though and does increase the complexity of the shuffle argument, but the resulting protocol still has the same sub-linear asymptotic complexity.
Special Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge Arguments of Knowledge
We will assume there is a setup algorithm that generates some setup information . This setup information could for instance be a description of a group that we will be working in. Consider a pair of probabilistic polynomial time interactive algorithms ( , ) called the prover and the verifier. They may have access to a common random string generated by a probabilistic polynomial time key generation algorithm . We consider a polynomial time decidable ternary relation . For an element we call a witness if ( , , ) ∈ . We define a corresponding group-dependent language consisting of elements that have a witness such that ( , , ) ∈ . We write tr ← ⟨ ( ), ( )⟩ for the public transcript produced by and when interacting on inputs and together with the randomness used by . This transcript ends with either accepting or rejecting. We sometimes shorten the notation by saying ⟨ ( ), ( )⟩ = if ends by accepting, = 1, or rejecting, = 0.
Definition 1 (Argument). The triple ( , , ) is called an argument for relation with setup if for all non-uniform polynomial time interactive adversaries we have Completeness:
Computational soundness:
Definition 2 (Public coin argument). An argument ( , , ) is public coin if the verifier's messages are chosen uniformly at random independently of the messages sent by the prover and the setup parameters , .
We define special honest verifier zero-knowledge (SHVZK) [CDS94] for a public coin argument as the ability to simulate the transcript for any set of challenges without access to the witness.
Definition 3 (Perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge). The public coin argument ( , , ) is called a special honest verifier zero-knowledge argument for with setup if there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator such that for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries we have
We remark that there are efficient techniques to convert SHVZK arguments into zero-knowledge arguments for arbitrary verifiers in the common random string model [Dam00, GMY06, Gro04] . In this paper, we will therefore for simplicity focus just on the special honest verifier zero-knowledge case.
WITNESS-EXTENDED EMULATION. We shall define an argument of knowledge 3 through witness-extended emulation, the name taken from Lindell [Lin03] . Whereas Lindell's definition pertains to proofs of knowledge in the plain model, we will adapt his definition to the setting of public coin arguments in the common random string model. Informally, our definition says: given an adversary that produces an acceptable argument with probability , there exists an emulator that produces a similar argument with probability , but at the same time provides a witness.
Definition 4 (Witness-extended emulation). We say the public coin argument ( , , ) has witness-extended emulation if for all deterministic polynomial time * there exists an expected polynomial time emulator such that for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries we have
(tr) = 1 and if tr is accepting then
where has access to a transcript oracle ⟨ * ( , , , ), ( , , )⟩ that can be rewound to a particular round and run again with the verifier using fresh randomness.
We think of as being the state of * , including the randomness. Then we have an argument of knowledge in the sense that the emulator can extract a witness whenever * is able to make a convincing argument. This shows that the definition implies soundness. We remark that the verifier's randomness is part of the transcript and the prover is deterministic. So combining the emulated transcript with , , , gives us the view of both the prover and the verifier and at the same time gives us the witness.
Damgård and Fujisaki [DF02] have suggested an alternative definition of an argument of knowledge in the presence of a common random string. Witness-extended emulation as defined above implies knowledge soundness as defined by them [Gro04] . THE FIAT-SHAMIR HEURISTIC. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86] can be used to make public coin SHVZK arguments non-interactive. In the Fiat-Shamir heuristic the verifier's challenges are computed by applying a cryptographic hash-function to the transcript of the protocol. Security can be formally argued in the random oracle model [BR93] , in which the hash-function is modeled as a completely random function that returns a random string on each input it has not been queried before. While the Fiat-Shamir heuristic is not sound in general [GK03] , it is still commonly believed to be a safe practice when applied to "natural" protocols.
Problem Specification and Setup
We will construct a 7-move public coin perfect SHVZK argument for the relation
In our SHVZK argument, the common random string will be generated as a public key ( 1 , . . . , , ℎ) for the -element Pedersen commitment scheme described in Section 2.3. Depending on the applications, there are many possible choices for who generates the commitment key and how this generation is done. For use in a mix-net, we could for instance imagine that there is a setup phase, where the mix-servers run a multi-party computation protocol to generate the setup and the commitment key. Another option is to let the verifier generate the common random string, since it is easy to verify whether a commitment key is valid or not. This option yields an 8-move (honest-verifier zero-knowledge) argument in the plain model. 4
Polynomial Identity Testing
For completeness we state a variation of the well-known Schwartz-Zippel lemma that we use several times in the paper.
Lemma 5 (Schwartz-Zippel). Let be a non-zero multivariate polynomial of degree over ℤ , then the probability of ( 1 , . . . , ) = 0 for randomly chosen 1 , . . . , ← ℤ is at most / .
The Schwartz-Zippel lemma is frequently used in polynomial identity testing. Given two multi-variate polynomials 1 and 2 we can test whether 1 ( 1 , . . . , ) − 2 ( 1 , . . . , ) = 0 for random 1 , . . . , ← ℤ . If the two polynomials are identical this will always be true, whereas if the two polynomials are different then there is only probability max( 1 , 2 )/ for the equality to hold.
Product of Committed Elements
Consider a sequence of commitments 1 , . . . , and a value ∈ ℤ . We will give an SHVZK argument of knowledge of { } . . .
The argument is of sub-linear size; the prover will send 2 commitments and 2 elements from ℤ , where = is the total number of committed elements . For = 1/3 this gives a size of ( 2/3 ) bits. The argument is quite complex so let us first describe some of the ideas that go into it. In our argument, the prover will prove knowledge of the contents of the commitments. For the sake of simplicity we will first describe the argument assuming the prover knows the contents of the commitments and by the computational binding property of the commitment scheme is bound to these values. We will also for the sake of simplicity just focus on soundness and later when giving the full protocol add extra parts that will give us honest verifier zero-knowledge and witness-extended emulation. (Note that even completeness and soundness alone are nontrivial to achieve when considering sublinear communication arguments.)
Consider first commitments 1 , . . . , as described above. The verifier will pick a random challenge 1 , . . . , . By the homomorphic property
).
In our argument the prover will open this commitment multi-exponentiation as
Consider now the case where we have three sets of commitments 
In our proofs the verifier will check for each column that = . These checks can be seen as quadratic equations in variables 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , of the form
If ℓ = ℓ for all , ℓ, the check will always pass, whereas if this is not the case, then by the SchwartzZippel lemma there is overwhelming probability over the choice of 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , that the check will fail. (This type of checking is also used in the Hadamard-based PCP of Arora et al. [ALM + 98].) We therefore have an argument for being a commitment to { } =1 . The commitments ℓ for ∕ = ℓ are just fillers that make the argument work, we will not need them for anything else. In the argument we only reveal ( ) elements in ℤ to simultaneously prove = equalities = ; this is what will give us sub-linear communication complexity.
Let us now explain how we choose the matrix .
. This means that is a matrix chosen such that is the previous element in the matrix multiplied with . In particular, we have
= . In addition, we will have an extra column with 10 := 1 and for 1 < ≤ : 0 := −1, . In other words, the 0th column vector is the th column vector of shifted one step down. The prover will make a separate set of commitments ′ 1 , . . . , ′ to this column. Choosing ′ 1 := com (1; 0) it is straightforward to verify that 10 = 1. To show that the rest of the 0th column is correctly constructed the prover will open
. The linear equations give us ∑ −1 ℓ=2 ℓ−1 ℓ0 + = ∑ ℓ=1 ℓ ℓ , which by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma has negligible probability of being true unless = and ℓ+1,0 = ℓ for 1 ≤ ℓ < . We have now described extended with a 0th column vector. Write˜ for the matrix with the 0th column and the first − 1 columns of . We will apply the , , matrix argument we described before to the matrices ,˜ , , where we use commitments := . This argument demonstrates for each 1 ≤ ≤ that = , −1 . Putting everything together we now have: 10 = 1, = , −1 , 0 = −1, and = , which is sufficient to conclude that = ∏ =1 ∏ =1 . We will now describe the full protocol. The most significant change from the description given above is that we now add also elements 0 , 0 that are chosen at random to the matrices. The role of these elements is to give honest verifier zero-knowledge. The prover reveals elements of the form := 0 + ∑ For 0 ≤ , ℓ ≤ : 
Send ( 1 , . . . , , 0 , . . . , , , , ′ ,ˆ , ) to the verifier Verification:
Theorem 6. The protocol described above is a 3-move public-coin perfect SHVZK argument of knowledge of and such that = ∏
and for all we have = com ( 1 , . . . , ; ).
Proof. Perfect completeness follows by verification.
PERFECT SHVZK. Given challenge 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , the simulator works as follows. It picks
0 , 0ℓ , ℓ as random commitments to 0. It computes 00 := com ( 1 0 , . . . ,
. It picks ′ 2 , . . . , ′ as random commitments to 0 and setŝ
. . , ′ ,ˆ , 00 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , , 0 , . . . , , , , ′ ,ˆ , ). We will now show that the simulation has the same distribution as a real argument on challenge 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , using witness { } , =1, =1 and { } =1 . Compute in the simulation 0 := − ∑
=1
, 0 := − ∑ ℓ=1 ℓ ℓ , 00 := 0 − ∑ ℓ=1 ℓ ℓ0 . Since 1 , . . . , , 0 , . . . , are chosen at random, this gives a uniform distribution on 0 , 0 , 00 just as in a real argument. In the simulation we make commitments 0 , 0ℓ , ℓ to (0, . . . , 0) and ′ ℓ to 0, but since the commitment scheme is perfectly hiding these commitments cannot be distinguished from commitments computed according to the way we do it in a real argument. We conclude by observing that both in the simulation and in a real argument, the remaining part of the argument, namely 00 , ′ 0 ,ˆ , 0 and 0 get the same distribution conditioned on the uniform distribution of , , ′ ,ˆ , . WITNESS-EXTENDED EMULATION. We will first show how to extract the contents of all the commitments in an acceptable argument. Next, we will show that with overwhelming probability this gives us a witness for the statement.
Consider a deterministic adversarial prover * with unknown probability for making an acceptable argument. We run it once on random challenges. If the argument is invalid we do not need to take further action, but if it is acceptable we need to extract a witness for the statement. We therefore rewind and run ⟨ * , ⟩ again until we have ( + 1) 2 successful arguments on random challenges. This takes an expected number of ( + 1) 2 / runs, but we only have to do it when * is successful in the first place, which happens with probability . Therefore, the expected run-time is ( + 1) 2 .
With overwhelming probability the first + 1 vectors (1, 1 , . . . , ) are linearly independent. This means that there exists linear combinations of the + 1 (1, 1 , . . . , )-vectors that give us either of the vectors (1, 0, . . . , 0), (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) .
Consider next the first + 1 vectors (1, 1 , . . . , ) that are answered successfully. Again, with overwhelming probability they are linearly independent. There are therefore linear combinations of them that give us each of the vectors (1, 0, . . . , 0), (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , (0, . . . , 0, 1). . vectors (1, 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , , 1 1 , . . . , ) are also linearly independent with overwhelming probability. We can therefore from the ( + 1) 2 acceptable runs with equalities
Similarly, the equalities
find linear combinations that give us openings ℓ , ℓ of the ( + 1) 2 commitments ℓ . We have shown how to extract openings in expected polynomial time of all the commitments in the argument. Next, we will argue that there is negligible probability of the emulator getting an acceptable argument for which it has to extract a witness, yet ending up extracting 11 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , so
By the binding property of the commitment scheme we can assume the commitments have unique contents, i.e., for instance that = for all 1 ≤ ≤ , 1 ≤ ≤ . This means that in the acceptable argument we have = 0 + ∑ =1 and = 0 + ∑ ℓ=1 ℓ and 0 = 00 + 1 + ∑ ℓ=2 ℓ ℓ0 . Since ′ 1 = com (1; 0) we have 10 = 1. Sinceˆ ∏ ℓ=2 ( ′ ℓ ) ℓ−1 = com ( − ;ˆ ) we have with overwhelming probability over 1 , . . . , that 20 = 1 , . . . , 0 = −1, and also = . The equation
and writing out the product
gives us with overwhelming probability over 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , that = = , −1 for 1 ≤ ≤ , 1 ≤ ≤ . Combining these pieces of information we see that
. This gives us ∏
=1
∏ =1 = = as we required. □
Committed Permutation of Known Elements
Consider a vector of commitments 1 , . . . , and a set of values { } , =1, =1 . In this section we will give an argument of knowledge of ∈ Σ and { } =1 such that:
. . .
Our argument uses Neff's idea [Nef01] , which is to let the verifier pick a value at random and let the prover argue that the committed values satisfy ( 1) , . . . , −1 ( ) ; ).
Proof. Perfect completeness follows from the homomorphic properties of the commitment scheme and invariance under permutation of the roots of a polynomial:
. Perfect SHVZK follows from the perfect SHVZK of the committed product argument.
We will now prove that we have witness-extended emulation. We first run the protocol with a random ← ℤ and random challenges for the argument of knowledge of committed product. If accepting, we rewind to the point where we have just sent to the prover and run the witness extractor to get openings
By the homomorphic property of the commitment scheme this gives us openings
. The process takes an expected number of ( + 1) 2 steps, since at the point where the prover has received and has probability of making an acceptable argument, the extractor uses an expected number of ( + 1) 2 runs.
What remains is to argue that with overwhelming probability there is a permutation ∈ Σ such that := − = −1 ( ) . To see this consider the adversary * with non-negligible probability of making a convincing argument on a random challenge . There is then non-negligible probability that we extract an opening , ′ of 1 , . . . ,
. By the binding property of the commitment we then have for a new random that with non-negligible probability
Unless there exists a permutation ∈ Σ so = −1 ( ) the Schwartz-Zippel lemma gives us less than probability / for this equality to hold for random . □
Multi-exponentiation to Committed Exponents
Consider a set of commitments 1 , . . . , , a matrix of ciphertexts 11 , . . . , and a ciphertext . In this section we will give an argument of knowledge of { } , =1, =1 , { } =1 and such that:
The argument will contain 2 commitments, 2 ciphertexts and elements in ℤ , where = . Choosing = 1/3 gives a communication complexity of ( 2/3 ) bits.
When describing the idea, let us first just consider how to get soundness and ignore the issue of zeroknowledge for a moment. In the argument, the prover will prove knowledge of the committed exponents, so let us from now on assume the committed values are well-defined. The prover can compute 2 ciphertexts
. Ignoring that can be dealt with using standard zero-knowledge techniques all that remains is for the verifier to be convinced ℓ have been correctly computed. For this purpose the verifier will select challenges 1 , . . . , ← ℤ at random. The prover will open ∏
=1
to the values 1 := ∑ =1 1 , . . . , := ∑
. The verifier now checks for each
ℓ . Writing this out we have
Since are chosen at random, there is overwhelming probability for one of these checks to fail unless for all , ℓ we have ℓ = ∏ =1 ℓ . In the argument, we wish to have honest verifier zero-knowledge. We will therefore multiply the ℓ ciphertexts with random encryptions to avoid leaking information about the exponents. This, however, makes it possible to encrypt anything in ℓ , so to avoid cheating we commit to the plaintexts of those random encryptions and use the commitments to prove that they all cancel out against each other.
Initial message:
01 , . . . , 0 ← ℤ ; 0 ← ℛ ; 0 = com ( 01 , 02 , . . . , 0 ; 0 ) 01 , . . . ,
Theorem 8. The protocol above is a 3-move public coin perfect SHVZK argument of knowledge of
Proof. Perfect completeness can be verified directly.
PERFECT SHVZK. The simulator on challenge 1 , . . . , simulates the argument as follows. It picks 11 , . . . , ← ℛ and 11 , . . . , ← ℤ and computes ℓ := ( ℓ ; ℓ ). , 01 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , , , 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , ). We will now prove that a simulated argument is indistinguishable from a real argument on challenge 1 , . . . , . Observe first that both in the simulation and in the real argument we get a uniform random distribution of ciphertexts ℓ for 1 ≤ , ℓ ≤ conditioned on = ∏
=1
. Given the from the witness, the ℓ ciphertexts determine 11 , . . . , uniquely such that ∑ =1 = 0. Since the commitment scheme is perfectly hiding, the distribution of commitments 11 , . . . , to 0 in the simulation is identical to the distribution of commitments we get in a real argument. In the simulation, we pick 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , , , 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , at random, which indirectly defines uniformly random values 0 , 0 , 0ℓ , 0ℓ , 0ℓ . We have with these values that they give the uniquely determined 0ℓ , 0ℓ , 0 such that 0 ∏ =1 = com ( 1 , . . . , ; ) and for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ that
We conclude that the distributions of simulated arguments and real arguments are the same.
WITNESS-EXTENDED EMULATION. Consider a deterministic adversary * with probability of creating an acceptable argument. We run it with a random challenge 1 , . . . , . If it fails to produce an acceptable argument we do not need to extract a witness, but with probability it does produce an acceptable argument and we must try to extract a witness. We run ⟨ * , ⟩ until we have + 1 acceptable arguments with random challenges 1 , . . . , . We can expect to use ⋅ ( + 1)/ = + 1 runs in this phase.
We will now argue that we can extract openings of the commitments and deduce how 01 , . . . , have been constructed. With overwhelming probability the + 1 challenge vectors (1, 1 , . . . , ) for which we have gotten acceptable arguments are linearly independent. We can therefore find linear combinations giving Similarly, taking linear combinations of the + 1 equalities 0ℓ ∏ =1 ℓ = com ( ℓ ; ℓ ) for each ℓ gives us openings 0ℓ , . . . , ℓ , 0ℓ , . . . , ℓ so ℓ = com ( ℓ ; ℓ ).
For each ℓ we also have +1 equalities
ℓ . By taking appropriate linear combinations we find 0ℓ , . . . , ℓ so ℓ = ( ℓ ; ℓ ) ∏ =1 ℓ . Now we know openings of the commitments and how the ciphertexts have been constructed. The binding property of the commitment scheme and the equality ∏ =1 = com (0; 0) gives us ∑ =1 = 0. We have
. This gives us a witness ( 11 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , , ) for the statement. □
Shuffle Argument
Given ciphertexts { } , =1, =1 and { } , =1, =1 we will give an argument of knowledge of ∈ Σ and { } , =1, =1 such that for all , we have = −1 ( ) (1; ). The most expensive components of the argument will be a product of committed elements argument and a multi-exponentiation to committed elements argument described in the previous sections. The total size of the argument is therefore ( 2 + ) bits, where = . With = 1/3 this gives an argument of size ( 2/3 ) bits.
The argument proceeds in seven steps. First the prover commits to the permutation , by making a commitment to 1, . . . , in permuted order. Then the verifier picks challenges 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , at random. The prover commits to the challenges in permuted order. The prover now proves that she has committed to permuted in the same order as the permutation committed to in the initial commitment. The point of the argument is that since the permutation is committed before seeing the challenges, the prover has no choice in creating the commitment, the random challenges have already been assigned unique slots in the commitment.
The other part of the argument is to use the committed exponentiation technique to show that
( ) for some known . If we look at the plaintext, this implies
With the permutation fixed before the challenges are chosen at random there is overwhelming probability that the argument fails unless for all , we have = −1 ( ) .
Initial message: The prover sets ( ) := ( − 1) + . Second challenge: ← ℤ Answer: Make a 4-move argument of knowledge of ∈ Σ and openings of 1 1 , . . . , so they contain a permutation of the values ( ( − 1) + ) + . Observe, the first move of this argument can be made in parallel with the second challenge so we only use three additional moves.
Make a 3-move argument of knowledge of , , so 1 = com ( 11 , 12 , . . . , 1 ; 1 ) . . .
Theorem 9. The protocol is a 7-move public coin perfect SHVZK argument of knowledge of ∈ Σ and ∈ ℛ so = −1 ( ) (1; ).
Proof. Perfect completeness follows from the perfect completeness of the underlying arguments of knowledge. Perfect SHVZK follows from the perfect SHVZK of the underlying arguments. What remains is to prove that we have witness-extended emulation. We run the prover * with random challenges 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , , and challenges for the arguments of knowledge. If we get an acceptable argument, we have to extract a witness. We run ⟨ * , ⟩ until we have acceptable answers to sets of challenges 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , . In each of these runs, we run the witnessextractor for the multi-exponentiation to committed elements argument to get openings of 1 , . . . , and an ∈ ℛ so 1 := com ( 11 , 12 , . . . , 1 ; 1 ) . . .
and
(1; ).
We also run the witness-extended extractor for the committed permutation of known elements to get openings of 1 1 , . . . , . Provided ∕ = 0 this gives us an opening of 1 , . . . , . We will now argue that with overwhelming probability we have either an invalid argument and do not need to extract a witness or alternatively we have sufficient information to compute a witness. The permutation argument gives us that + is a permutation of ( ( − 1) + ) + in each of the runs with different challenges 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , . With overwhelming probability over there exists a permutation ∈ Σ such that ( ) = ( − 1) + and ( ) = . Since we commit to in the first round, all runs must have the same permutation . With overwhelming probability the vectors ( 1 1 , . . . , ) are linearly independent. Taking appropriate linear combinations of the equalities
(1; ) gives us = ( ) (1; ) for computed as an appropriate linear combination of the values found in the argument. We output the witness ( , 11 , . . . ,
). □
Efficient Verification
The small size of the argument gives a corresponding low cost of verification. There are, however, 2 ciphertexts that we must exponentiate in the verification. In this section we show that the verifier computation can be reduced to making multi-exponentiations of the ciphertexts to small exponents.
Prover-Assisted Multi-exponentiation
In our shuffle argument, the verifier has to compute
The prover can assist this computation by computing 1 , . . . , as := ∏
=1
. The verifier can then compute
What remains is for the verifier to check that the ciphertexts are correct, which can be done by verifying
for randomly chosen . Since the check is done off-line, the verifier can use small exponents , say, 32-bit exponents. This trick reduces the amount of verifier computation that is needed for computing ∏ =1 ∏ =1 to one -exponentiation to exponents from ℤ and + 1 -exponentiations to small exponents.
When is small, this strategy may actually end up increasing the communication complexity of the shuffle. However, the exact same method can be employed when we let the verifier compute the -values as products the products of 1 , . . . , 1 and 1 , . . . , 2 where = 1 2 . If we choose 2 = √ for instance, we get that the prover only sends √ ciphertexts to the verifier. The verifier then makes √ -multi-exponentiations to small exponents 1 , . . . , √ .
Randomized Verification
In the argument for multi-exponentiation to committed exponents, the verifier must check equalities of the form
This can be done off-line in a randomized way by picking 1 , . . . , at random and testing whether
) .
This way, we make -multi-exponentiations to small exponents ℓ and one -multi-exponentiation to larger exponents .
Comparison
Let us compare our shuffle argument with the most efficient arguments for correctness of a shuffle of ElGamal ciphertexts in the literature. Furukawa and Sako [FS01] suggested an efficient argument for correctness of a shuffle based on committing to a permutation matrix. This scheme was further refined by Furukawa [Fur05] . We will use Groth and Lu's [GL07] estimates for the complexity of Furukawa's scheme. Neff [Nef01, Nef03] gave an efficient interactive proof for correctness of a shuffle. Building on those ideas Groth [Gro03] suggested a perfect SHVZK argument for correctness of a shuffle. Our shuffle argument builds on Neff's and Groth's schemes.
We will compare the schemes using an elliptic curve of prime order . We use | | = 256 so SHA256 can be used to choose the public coin challenges. We measure the communication complexity in bits and measure the prover and verifier computation in single exponentiations. By this we mean that in all schemes, we count the cost of a multi-exponentiation to exponents as single exponentiations. We compare the most efficient shuffle arguments in Table 1 randomization techniques from Section 7 then the prover's cost increases by 2 exponentiations, whereas the verifier's complexity reduces to 4 small exponentiations and 2 +3 exponentiations to full size exponents from ℤ . For all schemes it holds that multi-exponentiation techniques can reduce their cost, see e.g. Lim [Lim00] . We refer to the full paper of Groth [Gro03] for a discussion of randomization techniques and other tricks that can be used to reduce the computational complexity of all the shuffle arguments. An additional improvement of our scheme is to let the prover assist the verifier in computing the multi-exponentiation ∏ =1 ∏ =1 , see Section 7. Table 2 has back-of-the-envelope estimates when we compare an optimized version of our scheme to that of Groth [Gro03] . We assume that we are shuffling = 100, 000 ElGamal ciphertexts with parameters = 10, = 10, 000 so = . We count the computational cost in the number of multiplications. In parenthesis we are giving timing estimates assuming the use of equipment where a multiplication takes 1 , which is conservative given today's equipment. We only count the cost of the shuffle argument in Table 2 , not the cost of computing the shuffle or the size of the shuffle (51 Mbits).
Groth [Gro03] proposed Prover's computation 18 ⋅ 10 6 mults (18 sec.) 143 ⋅ 10 6 mults (143 sec.) Verifier's computation 14 ⋅ 10 6 mults (14 sec.) 5 ⋅ 10 6 mults ( 5 sec.) Prover's communication 77 Mbits 8 Mbits 
